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1. Introduction 
 
The influence on local government organization and management of new public 
management practices promoted by national administrative reforms remains an issue of 
contention. On one hand, some authors argue that these reforms have produced similar 
results at both the central and local levels of government (John 2001; Sanderson 2001; 
Van Gramberg & Teicher 2000). Others consider that the political nature of elected 
mayors and their legitimacy derived from close proximity with voters has limited its 
impact at the local level (McLaughlin 2002). However, it is unquestionable that local 
governance has changed over the years, distancing itself from traditional management 
involving clearly defined hierarchical relations, long-lasting career systems, 
bureaucratic control mechanisms, and in-house production. The influence of Public 
Choice theory and the New Public Management reforms have transformed local 
governance, albeit the degree of change remains under dispute. These changes resulted 
in the adoption of alternative mechanisms to deliver public services based on the 
externalization of service delivery, either using market approaches or employing 
partnerships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
The influence of New Public Management reforms brought about new service 
delivery arrangements replacing traditional bureaucratic in-house supply. Examples of 
these arrangements include: 1) CCT (Compulsory Competitive Tendering) replacing 
service delivery through in-house formal hierarchy with contracting (Fenwick, Shaw, & 
Foreman 1994); 2) Best Value relying on the comparison between delivery by the local 
government bureaucracy and alternative solutions provided by the market (Sanderson, 
2001; Martin & Hartley 2000); 3) Local Government Amendment stressing the 
separation of municipal functions and highlighting the need for a corporate approach to 
commercial type functions (Wallis & Dollery 2001); and 4) New Steering Model (NSM) 
promoting functional decentralization and service autonomy to accomplish efficiency 
gains and quality in service delivery (Reichard 2003).  
Currently, local governments are responsible for the provision of an ever 
growing number of public services, including education, social services, land use 
planning and management, water supply, wastewater management, solid waste 
collection and management, and the promotion of local economic development. The 
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mayoral system at the local level associated with the traditional administrative culture 
has produced resistance to the introduction and implementation of New Public 
Management reforms. In-house bureaucratic solutions still represent a large proportion 
of service delivery choices among Portuguese local governments. Nevertheless, the 
adoption of new governance mechanisms based on market competition and contracting 
out began increasing by the end of the 1990s. In recent years, we also witnessed the rise 
of alternatives to both market and hierarchy, through solutions relying on network 
partnerships and municipal cooperation. The large number of functions assumed by 
local governments as a result of central government delegation generated a substantial 
increase in the number and diversity of alternative governance mechanisms. 
We analyse the choice between these governance mechanisms in light of current 
trends of administrative reform. Our central hypothesis follows Robert Stein’s 1993 
assertion that service characteristics influence the choice among governance 
mechanisms (hierarchy, market or network). We match three types of municipal 
services with these governance mechanisms and develop our hypotheses accordingly. 
First, we expect regulatory and monitoring activities to be provided by hierarchy type 
mechanisms (Lowi 1964; Peterson 1981; Barney 1999). Second, for activities involving 
the delivery of private goods and services (rival consumption and exclusion), local 
government officials will be inclined to use market-type mechanisms (Brown & Potoski 
2003a; Ostrom & Ostrom 1977). Finally, social services, generally involving 
redistributive and social policies are most likely provided by network type mechanisms 
(Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock 2007; Brandsen & Pestoff 2006; Osbourne & 
McLaughlin 2004; Lowi 1964). The empirical analysis employs data collected from a 
sample of 102 Portuguese local governments between February and October 2008. 
 
2. Service Characteristics, Transaction Costs, and Sector Choice 
 
The idea that local government officials choose service delivery mechanisms to 
match the specific characteristics of the services to be provided has been under scrutiny 
for some time in the empirical literature (Stein 1993; Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse 
2003).  Much of the literature employs a transaction costs framework identifying asset 
specificity, service measurability, and the frequency of transactions as major factors 
influencing sector choice decisions in providing municipal services (Brown and Potoski 
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2003a; 2003b; Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008).  Other authors organize municipal 
services according to existing policy typologies to derive testable hypotheses regarding 
service delivery sector choice (Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse 2003).  Our paper 
contributes to these streams of literature by providing a detailed analysis of local 
official’s choices regarding all services provided by Portuguese local governments. 
 
Transaction Costs Framework and Service Delivery Choices 
 
Much of the literature employs a transaction costs framework (TCF) to argue 
that sector choice is largely determined by the transaction costs faced by local officials 
when choosing among the available options. According to the TCF, both production 
costs and transaction costs have to be considered when making decisions on sector 
choice for service delivery.  Transaction costs result from the negotiation, monitoring, 
and enforcement of contracts and include the information costs of selecting the 
provider, the costs of writing the agreement to include appropriate standards of 
efficiency and quality of performance, and monitoring and enforcing that same 
agreement (Brown and Potoski 2003a; Coase 1937; Williamson 1975).  The choice 
among the available service providers is determined by the ability to minimize 
transaction costs (Brown and Potoski 2003a; Nelson 1997; Ferris & Graddy 1997; 
Dollery 2001; Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha and Dasse 2007).  Moreover, local 
elected executives trade-off transaction costs of in-house production with agency costs 
of delegation to external providers when deciding how to deliver local public services. 
These trade-offs manifest themselves politically in terms of electoral benefits and costs, 
so that when externalization is more attractive from an electoral standpoint, direct 
provision will be less appealing and vice versa. 
The TCF literature argues that transaction costs increase as a result of 
information asymmetry between contracting parties caused by service characteristics 
and environmental uncertainty (Brown and Potoski 2003; Williamson 1975).  Asset 
specificity increases transaction costs substantially because goods and services with this 
characteristic cannot be easily redeployed for alternative uses. Water and gas pipelines, 
garbage trucks, and medical technology are examples of physical asset specificity, since 
these equipments have very limited uses in other alternatives. Highly skilled 
professionals such as space engineers, nuclear physicists, medical doctors, and even 
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university professors (!) display high human asset specificity. They usually involve 
extensive training in highly specialized tasks that are difficult to deploy in alternative 
uses. 
Service measurability can also affect the level of transaction costs because it is 
less problematic to write agreements for tangible goods and services.  In contrast, 
services involving highly complex systems of delivery or difficult monitoring processes 
significantly raise transaction costs.  
The environment in which service delivery takes place can also adversely affect 
the size of transaction costs.  The frequency of transactions between contracting parties, 
local government political and/or administrative instability, and the financial health of 
the municipality can adversely impact the level of transaction costs and the choices 
regarding service delivery sectors.  Feiock, Clingermayer and Dasse (2003) employ a 
multinomial logit model to explain the choice between direct service provision, 
contracting with other government, contracting out to a non-profit organization, and 
contracting out to the private sector. The authors find that executive turnover influences 
contracting out decisions with private sector providers, by affecting the municipality’s 
ability to negotiate contracts, make credible commitments to suppliers, and sustain and 
enforce contracts. 
Asset specificity and service complexity involve large transaction costs and this 
can hinder contracting out to private vendors, due to possible opportunistic behaviour of 
the agents. However, in order to take advantage of efficiency gains associated with 
highly specialized private providers, local officials can opt for partnerships with the not-
for-profit sector (Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2007), although in-house service 
provision is still a prevailing option, especially because of strong inertial effects 
(Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008).  
   
Policy Typologies and Service Delivery Choices 
 
A much less explored avenue of research on service characteristics employs 
policy typologies to classify public goods and services in specific groups and uses each 
cell to develop testable hypotheses regarding the link between service characteristics 
and governance mechanisms. 
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The aspiration to classify public policies in a “perfect” typology has been a 
concern of scholarly work in political science for decades (Lowi 1964; Ostrom and 
Ostrom 1977; Peterson 1981). Typologies are useful because they allow the 
organization of a complex reality with simple, clear-cut criteria. Even if policies are not 
amenable to mutually exclusive categorization, their differences can be better 
understood with these efforts at classification. In addition, typologies allow the 
development of theoretical hypotheses that can be subjected to empirical testing. 
The literature investigating local government service delivery has sought to 
connect different typologies of goods and services with the choice of institutional 
arrangements for service delivery. The most widely accepted classification of goods and 
services employs the criteria of rivalry in consumption and excludability in ownership 
and use to link four types of goods and services with the institutional arrangements 
employed to supply them (Ostrom and Ostrom 1977; Stein 1993) (see table I). Rivalry 
in consumption means that if one person consumes the good or service someone else 
cannot use it. Excludability in ownership and consumption implies that individuals can 
only access the good or service if they pay for access to the person(s) who control(s) it. 
According to this typology of goods and services, the market allocates private 
goods efficiently, so that local governments concerned with efficiency goals would 
prefer market mechanisms to supply these goods and services. In the opposite extreme, 
the market cannot provide collective goods, since this will result in underprovision due 
to free rider problems. In general, collective goods require provision through some form 
of direct service arrangement1. Both toll goods, also known as marketable public goods, 
and common pool resources entail some type of hybrid solution. Empirical research 
indicates that local governments behave in accordance with the hypotheses suggested by 
the theory. Stein (1993) finds that collective goods are primarily provided using direct 
modes of service arrangement, whereas private goods and services are usually delivered 
through contracting arrangements. Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003) conclude 
that common property resource goods and services are more likely contracted out to 
other governments and to non-profit organizations and less likely contracted out to for-
profit firms. 
 
Table 1. Policy Typology (Rivalry vs. Exclusion) 
                                                
1 For the exceptions see Olson (1965). 
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 Rival Nonrival 
Excludable Private Goods 
(Market) 
Toll Goods 
(Hybrid Solutions) 
Nonexcludable Common Pool Resources 
(Hybrid Solutions) 
Collective Goods 
(Public Bureaucracies) 
Adapted from Ostrom and Ostrom (1977); Stein (1993); Weimer and Vining (1999). 
 
Paul Peterson’s classification of goods in developmental, allocational, and 
redistributive has also been linked with institutional arrangements of service provision 
(Peterson 1981; Stein 1993). The work by Robert Stein finds that a large majority of 
developmental services is provided directly by the municipal government. The 
provision of allocational services has increased substantially over the period under 
analysis, whereas redistributive services are largely provided through non-direct 
institutional arrangements (Stein, 1993: 85). 
The fact that municipal governments display specific patterns in service 
privatization is not new. Solid waste collection is by far one of the most frequently 
mentioned as amenable to private contracting (Savas 1982; Morgan 1989). A survey of 
America’s 66 largest cities in 1995 indicated that vehicle towing, solid waste collection, 
building security, street repair and ambulance services were the most privatized services 
in the US (Dilger, Moffett, and Struyk 1997). These services are particularly well-suited 
for privatization, namely because market competition can generate significant cost 
savings and production efficiencies derived from specialized providers (Morgan 1989). 
This paper expands on the policy typology tradition by developing and testing a 
set of hypotheses linking the nature of activities with the governance mechanisms of 
service delivery adopted by local governments in Portugal.  
 
3. Local Service Delivery in the Portuguese Context 
 
Local government in Portugal has a long tradition and its main units, called 
Concelhos (municipalities), have existed with significant autonomy since the Middle 
Age. Until 1820, municipalities had autonomy to manage the council business in what 
concerns land, commerce transportation regulations and street markets, road 
construction and maintenance, local income and price taxes, police power, among others 
(Manique 1989). Over time, centralization and state power turned the country into a 
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highly centralized administrative state (Livermore 1976). It was in the 19th century that 
municipal autonomy was suspended. At the time, the liberal regime attempted to 
rationalize the administrative system and to control municipalities, by embracing the 
French Napoleonic structure of administration. The debate about the territorial division 
and organization was inspired by the French administration. 
After a period of centralization and decentralization tendencies, which reflected 
the tensions between liberals and absolutists, the result was the reinforcement of 
centralization. The Napoleonic spirit prevailed and, like other southern countries, 
Portugal introduced the administrative code and the prefectural system headed by a 
Governador Civil. The Governador Civil was useful to maintain the constitutional 
system from internal subversion and to sustain the unity of the state. The Governor was 
the co-coordinator of all central government functions and the hierarchical superior of 
all other field agents, supervising, inspecting and controlling local governments. The 
administrative structure reinforced centralization and severely constrained the power of 
municipalities as well as their financial autonomy. Municipalities became progressively 
dependent and controlled by the central government. The rule of law, the appointment 
of mayors by national government and the characteristics of the Napoleonic model 
transformed municipalities in mere agencies of the central government. This represents 
an historical rupture where rationalization emphasizes the administrative dimension 
rather than local autonomy. 
 The advent of the republican regime in the early years of 20th century and 
particularly the authoritarian administration of the “Estado Novo” reinforced the 
centralist pattern of Portuguese Napoleonic institutions. According to Pereira 
(1992:124) “deep state centralism, besides a clear Jacobinism in the central political and 
administrative organization, and a significant weight of the bureaucracy” were the main 
elements of the Portuguese political administrative system. Hence, the republican 
regime did not grant autonomy to municipalities and severely constrained its financial 
autonomy (Oliveira 1996). Later on, the dictatorial regime of the ‘Estado Novo’ (1926-
1974) implemented a political administrative system highly centralized and based on the 
rule of the law and all sort of bureaucratic procedures. In this period the centralized 
pattern of Portuguese Public Administration was reinforced (Araújo 1999). The regime 
developed a corporative and autocratic emphasis, strengthened the importance of central 
government bureaucracy, and introduced institutional uniformity. 
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During the era of the dictatorship, Governors had strong and authoritarian 
powers in controlling local government and public service delivery.  The country was 
ruled by an autocratic regime which developed an extremely formal and hierarchical 
administrative system.  Mayors were appointed by the central government and 
hierarchically subordinated to the Governors of their district. The Governor had the 
power to dissolve local executives if they proved to have behaved illegally, failed to 
fulfil their administrative tasks or refused to carry out decisions made at higher levels. 
Furthermore, Governors had the power to scrutinize the municipal executive (Câmara 
Municipal), local public services and even to control civic associations and 
corporations. They also had police powers and were responsible for the maintenance of 
public order (CAREAT 1998). The authoritarian role of the Governador Civil at the 
district level was supported by the highly hierarchical structure of the overall 
administrative system. 
Although municipalities had been formally granted powers to impose taxes, pass 
local ordinances, grant licenses, and set the number and salaries of municipal employees 
these powers were hardly implemented. In practice their competencies were severely 
restricted to the essential ones: to manage municipal property, local development, local 
service delivery, public health, and a few more. Moreover, ‘most communication 
between central and local government took the form of directives and administrative 
decrees which preempted local initiatives and which municipalities were obliged to 
carry out and enforce’ (Opello 1983). 
Concerning the financial dimension, municipalities have two sources of 
revenues. First, revenues derived from small fines and from direct taxes on agricultural 
and industrial production and on business within the municipalities, as well from taxes 
on buildings permits and street markets. A second set of revenue sources granted by the 
central government for specific projects beyond the financial capability of the 
municipality. Municipal financial sources often depended on central government’s 
casuistic decisions, in a strong discretionary process using subsidies, participation in 
financing projects, and supporting local deficits (Camões 2006: 103).  
Local service delivery followed the characteristics of central government service 
provision in a mimetic process emphasizing direct delivery. Due to the limited functions 
they performed, municipal governments had only a Secretary and specialized services. 
They had no autonomy to set up their own organizational structure. The structure was 
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defined by law approved by the national government and was uniform to all 
municipalities. The only exceptions were the large cities of Lisbon and Porto.  
Services responsible to prepare decisions and to implement them were structured 
through hierarchical structures, the so called Serviços Municipais, which were divided 
in sections and repartitions (Oliveira 2001:128). Lisbon and Porto were allowed to 
create Directions of Services, Repartitions, Divisions and Sections. 
For those services of economic and industrial nature, such as water distribution, 
electricity, sewage, garbage collection, and public transportation, local governments 
were allowed to create Serviços Municipalizados, under certain conditions established 
by law (Pereira and Almeida 1985: 214). These services, approved by the Municipal 
Assembly (deliberative body) had some financial autonomy and an Executive Council, 
but stopped short of having corporate-like status, since the sole owner was the 
municipality and they remained integrated in the municipality (Caetano 1982). 
Therefore, during the dictatorship, municipalities had limited competencies and 
operated as an extension of the national government. For a period of almost fifty years, 
municipalities essentially played a role as units of administration of the state (Opello 
1983), acting as administrative agencies organizing its activities in-house according to a 
single structure model. Municipalities developed a bureaucratic administrative structure 
and direct management of local service delivery. 
 
Democracy and the challenge for local service delivery 
 
The democratic regime introduced in 1974 and the new Portuguese Constitution 
of 1976 re-established democratic local power, new service delivery roles, and financial 
and administrative autonomy. The Law of Municipalities (1977) established general 
functional areas such as patrimony administration, economic development, local service 
delivery, water and wastewater management, public health, education, culture, sports 
and leisure, emergency management, and public investment in infrastructures. 
The new regime and the newly acquired functions became a great challenge, 
particularly because municipalities were not technically prepared for such 
competencies, not only because of their weak organizational structures, but also due to 
the lack of highly skilled personnel. To some extent, this gap was filled by the 
establishment of local government inter-municipal cooperation through technical offices 
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called Gabinetes de Apoio Técnico (Technical Support Offices), which gave technical 
advice on inter-municipal projects to improve local infrastructure. This form of 
cooperation between local authorities encouraged joint management of local facilities 
and energy resources. At the time there was an acute lack of technical, administrative 
and managerial capacity in municipalities (Pereira 1993) and local service delivery 
followed the traditional in-house hierarchical approach. 
It was only in the mid1980’s that the law (Decree-law 116/84) allowed 
organizational autonomy to municipalities. The only limitation to organizational 
autonomy was personnel costs. The possibility of having new job vacancies allowed the 
development of the organizational structure to tackle new functional areas. However, 
the trend in service delivery remains highly hierarchical. Basically, the Serviços 
Municipais and Serviços Municipalizados remained the way to organize and deliver 
local services through in-house mechanisms.  
In spite of these trends, the size of local government did not increase 
immediately after the Democratic Revolution. The number of civil servants working in 
the public sector is evidence of the dimension of municipalities compared to the central 
government. Table 2 shows the distribution of civil servants among central and local 
government. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Civil Servants Across Levels of Government 
Year Central Administration % 
Local 
Government % Total 
1935 25 588 - n.a. - n.a 
1968 155 213 78.90% 41 542 21.10% 196 755 
1979 314 029 84.30% 58 266 15.70% 372 295 
1983 359 329 82.45% 76 466 17.55% 435 795 
1986 384 448 82.80% 79 873 17.20% 464 321 
1988 405 034 83.45% 80 334 16.55% 485 368 
1991 418 868 82.20% 90 864 17.80% 509 732 
2005 578 407 77.34% 169 473 22.66% 747 880 
   SOURCE: CITRA, 1987; DGAEP, 2008; DGAP, 1992 
   Since 2005 data includes the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores, military and 
 security forces, magistrate and fire man. 
 
The data shows the centralized nature of Portuguese Public Administration 
where, after thirty years of democracy, local government represents a little over 20% of 
the total number of civil servants. In what concerns the financial dimension, ‘the 
average financial dependency of local governments – transfers from the national 
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government to municipalities – is 45.5 per cent, but it ranges from 10 to 90 per cent, 
with a strong negative correlation with the level of economic development of the 
municipality’ (Tavares and Camões 2007). 
The new functional competencies and the political, social and economic 
development pressured the emergence of new forms of local service delivery. However, 
NPM ideas and new organizational forms are late comers in the Portuguese local 
government. The continental juridical tradition of administrative reform emphasizes 
changes in legislation not managerial changes (Rodrigues and Araújo 2006). According 
to Tavares and Camões, ‘Political culture and history contribute to explain this 
resistance to market provision and the predominance of state oriented alternatives” 
(2007: 537).  
Devolution of power to local governments, the growth of municipal activities, 
internal specialization, and the diversification of citizen preferences produced internal 
departmentalization. Later, the need for more flexible and efficient organizational forms 
led to the creation of single purpose organizations in the middle of the 1990s. Municipal 
corporations are constituted with capital from other municipalities as well as private 
investors. According to Tavares e Camões (2007) the number of single purpose 
organizations increased in a short period of five years (1998-2003) to over 100, and 
about 87% of municipalities have transferred services to municipal corporations.  
The influence of new modes of service delivery goes beyond municipal 
corporations. The legislation approved by the national government opened the 
opportunity for innovative ways to structure local service delivery through contracting 
out and network partnerships. The use of market type mechanisms and 
interorganizational forms of join production is now changing the modus operandi of 
municipalities.  
As soon as municipalities were allowed to explore alternative ways to deliver 
services, a dynamic process began to improve efficiency and service quality, frequently 
using benchmarking processes. The range of organizational configurations includes 
traditional, hierarchical type arrangements, market solutions, and network partnerships. 
Table 3 presents the whole gamut of organizational configurations and their 
distinguishing characteristics.  
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Table 3. Characteristics of Local Government Alternatives 
Organizational 
Configuration 
Degree of 
direct control 
Degree of 
competition 
Degree of inter-
organizational 
cooperation 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Municipal Services High None None HTM 
Municipalized 
Services High None 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
HTM 
Municipal 
Enterprises 
High but 
indirect None 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
HTM 
Inter-municipal 
Enterprises 
High – 
indirect and 
shared 
None 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Municipal 
Commercial 
Societies 
Moderate None 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Public Commercial 
Societies Moderate None 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Mixed Commercial 
Societies Very Low High 
Moderate, depending on 
the number of 
participants 
NTM 
Contracting-out Very Low High Low MTM 
Franchise Very Low High Low MTM 
Partnerships Low Medium High NTM 
Local Government 
Associations 
Moderate 
 Low High NTM 
Metropolitan 
Associations Moderate Low High NTM 
HTM – Hierarchy Type Mechanism 
MTM – Market Type Mechanism 
NTM – Network Type Mechanism 
 
This broad set of organizational alternatives raises an important research 
question. Since local authorities have a long standing tradition of organizing and 
delivering services through in-house bureaucracies, how far municipalities have they 
moved away from the traditional bureaucratic approach to service delivery? Given that 
hierarchical delivery mechanisms have predominated until the 1990s, this article 
provides a snapshot of what has changed since the introduction of the new forms of 
governance. Local government service delivery in Portugal provides a natural 
experiment of the choices of local officials regarding the delivery of specific services 
through the three types of mechanisms: hierarchy, market, and networks. In other 
words, it allows an empirical test of hypotheses regarding choices of externalization of 
local services.  
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4. Hypotheses 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the different alternatives available to local 
governments in order to deliver public services. The long-standing Portuguese local 
government tradition to adopt direct provision is currently being challenged by other 
alternatives. For some time now the academic community dedicated part of their 
research to the analysis of alternative governance mechanisms, particularly to private 
and nonprofit organizations as alternative governance mechanisms to service delivery 
(Frant 1996).  
The primary goal of this paper is to establish a relationship between the nature of 
the activities provided by local governments and the mechanisms of governance used. 
In other words, we seek to understand how the nature and service characteristics affect 
the choice of governance mechanisms (Stein 1993). Thus, based upon prior work in the 
tradition of policy typologies, we discuss a set of three different hypotheses, each 
aiming to test the relationship between the nature of activities and a specific governance 
mechanism. 
Our first hypothesis derives from research by Lowi (1964; 1972). The author 
identifies regulatory and supervisory activities as leading to the use of hierarchical 
mechanisms of policy implementation. This happens due to their degree of coerciveness 
to citizens, since these kinds of activities represent a limitation of free will.  We also 
argue that, in line with the policy typology elaborated by Peterson (1981), development 
and/or distribution activities are typically delivered through hierarchical governance 
mechanisms. Finally, according to Barney (1999), hierarchy is most appropriate to 
activities closely linked to the sovereignty functions of the State (in this case local 
governments). 
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Regulatory and supervisory policies are provided by hierarchical 
mechanisms. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Policies involving development and distribution activities are 
provided by hierarchical mechanisms. 
 
Our second hypothesis concerns the introduction of market mechanisms in 
public administration, which changed the concept of public service and the nature of the 
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agents responsible for delivering public services. Using rivalry in consumption and the 
possibility of exclusion as two dimensions of analysis, Ostrom e Ostrom (1977) propose 
a typology of goods and services that help predict preferences in service delivery by 
public or private agents (Levacic 1991; Stein 1993). Exclusion refers to the capacity and 
ability of the agent responsible for service delivery to limit access or consumption 
through price mechanisms. In its absence, any individual can free ride on the production 
of any good or service, thus making market supply unattractive to private for-profit 
agents. The concept of rivalry is the marginal variation in the utility that each consumer 
gets, when another person consumes the same service. If utility is unaffected, collective 
consumption is possible. Otherwise, consumption is individualized. Thus, private agents 
are particularly motivated to provide services that simultaneously require a payment for 
their use and display rivalry in consumption. In contrast, services where the amount 
paid is not directly related to what is being consumed, and where exclusion is 
problematic and rivalry in consumption is absent, are usually provided directly by local 
government employees. 
According to Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), market mechanisms are more feasible 
in situations where provision and production units can be easily separated. The 
collective units would be responsible for the provision of public goods and services, that 
is, responsible for planning and deciding what goods and services to provide, financing 
production (in whole or in part), and monitoring the levels of quality and citizen 
satisfaction. This role would be reserved to public agents, given their ability to collect 
taxes, and regulate and enforce standards of conduct of other agents. Private market 
units would be responsible for the effective production and distribution of goods and 
services that governing bodies decided to provide. 
Markets with multiple producers should be considered a feasible alternative to 
hierarchical mechanisms (Brown and Potoski 2003, 2005; Brown, Potoski, and Van 
Slyke 2006). Thus, in situations where there is a possibility and ease in determining unit 
costs, identifying the consumer, and promoting competition between producers, it is 
expected a prevalence of market solutions (McGuiness 1991).  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Activities involving rivalry in consumption and the possibility of 
exclusion are provided by market mechanisms.  
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Our third hypothesis is, again, based on the Peterson (1981) typology. The 
activities most appropriate to governance by networks are redistributive ones, that is, 
activities with concentrated benefits and diffused costs. The same is claimed for social 
services at the local government sphere (Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2007; Brandsen 
and Pestoff 2006; Osbourne and McLaughlin 2004).  
The market stereotype is usually associated with the individualistic spirit, pure 
economic rationality, and lack of cooperation between agents (Powell 1990). As such, 
in a competitive environment where each individual develops strategies that involve the 
failure of competitors, there is no place for interaction, integration, and social cohesion 
(Tenbensel 2005). Although the market presents itself as an alternative with the 
advantage of offering choice, efficiency, flexibility, and innovation, it can be inadequate 
to social services delivery due to the absence of local competitive markets and public 
management capacity (Van Slyke 2003, 2007; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). However, 
despite this fact, Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock (2007) argue that activities involving 
qualified labour-intensive resources, such as basic health care, mental health, hospitals, 
day centres, centres, are best performed by private actors.  
The decision maker must trade-off between efficiency gains and the difficulty to 
control private agent actions. To solve this dilemma, the solution of building networks 
with non-profit organizations seems the most appropriate. Because these organizations 
rely on volunteering work and enjoy tax-exemptions due to their non-profit status, they 
tend to have similar goals and missions when compared to public agents, thus avoiding 
the problem of moral hazard (Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2007; Brown, Potoski, 
and Van Slyke 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Activities that have a redistributive and social nature and require 
large initial investments are provided by network mechanisms. 
 
5. Organizational Configurations and Governance Mechanisms 
 
In Portugal, national legislation exhaustively enumerates all tasks assigned to 
municipalities. The functions and powers of Portuguese local governments are defined 
in specific laws in a rather generic list. This fact forced us to convert it into a more 
explicit one. We decided to submit a rating of 42 municipal activities classified in 5 
dimensions using research by Nelson (1997), Ferris and Graddy (1991, 1986), Feiock, 
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Clingermayer and Dasse (2003), and Brown and Potoski (2003a, 2005), combined with 
current Portuguese legislation.  
In order to test our hypotheses, we divided the list of 42 activities into three 
separate groups. The first group integrates local business development activities, 
distribution, regulatory, and supervisory functions. The second group is composed by 
activities characterized by rivalry in consumption and the possibility of exclusion. The 
last group includes activities with a redistributive or social nature as well as those 
requiring a high initial investment. 
 
 
Table 4. Municipal Services 
 
In order to better suit our investigation purposes, we linked each of the twelve 
alternative organizational configurations employed by Portuguese local governments 
with each major governance mechanism. The twelve organizational configurations were 
classified into Hierarchic Type Mechanisms (HTM), Market Type Mechanisms (MTM), 
or Network Type Mechanisms (TMR), according to:  
1. Degree of direct control – indicates the control exercised by the municipal 
executive. It is more direct when the executive makes use of its hierarchical 
powers to command and control production; 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
1. Audit and Licensing of Economic Activities;  
2. Urban Management and Planning;  
3. Management of Urban Mobility;  
4. Municipal Police;  
5. Veterinary Services  
6. Tourism Promotion;  
7. Urban Management and Rehabilitation;  
8. Foreign Cooperation;  
9. Fire Department and Civil Protection;  
10.  Graveyard Maintenance and Administration;  
11. Kennel Maintenance and Administration;  
12.  Swimming- Pool Maintenance and 
Management; 
13.  School Maintenance;  
14.  Stadium Maintenance and Management;  
15. Maintenance and administration of sports halls  
16.  Markets Suppliers Maintenance and 
Administration;  
17.  Industrial Park Maintenance and 
Management;  
18. Department of Urban Hygiene; 
1. Public Transportation;  
2. Water supply;  
3. Distribution of Electrical Power 
(Low-voltage);  
4. Building Safety;  
5. Building Maintenance;  
6. Road Conservation  
7. Solid Waste Collection;  
8. Maintenance of Public Parks and 
Gardens;  
9. Maintenance and Administration 
of Parking Facilities;  
10. Parking Management  
11. Canteen Maintenance and 
Administration;  
12. School Transportation Services; 
 
1. Health Care and Medical 
Assistance;  
2.  Elderly Service;  
3.  Poverty and Social Exclusion 
Combat Program;  
4.  Social Housing;  
5.  Kindergarten Maintenance and 
Administration;  
6. Youth Support Services; 
7.  Museum Maintenance and 
Management; 
8.  Library Maintenance and 
Management; 
9.  Theater Maintenance and 
Management; 
10. Aviation Infrastructure 
Maintenance and Administration;  
11.  Solid Waste Treatment;  
12. Wastewater Treatment; 
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2. Degree of competition – indicates the competitive environment in which an 
agent is involved in the delivery of public services; 
3. Degree of inter-organizational cooperation – indicates the degree of shared 
resources, information, and risks so as to generate a cohesive action for the 
delivery of public services. 
 
Table 3 displays the organizational configurations according to the degree of 
direct control, competition, and inter-organizational cooperation and links them with the 
more general governance mechanisms. Both in municipal and in municipalized services 
there is a strong presence of hierarchical control of local executive bodies, distant from 
any competition and cooperation with any other organization. In both cases, the mayor 
is directly responsible for the satisfaction of citizens’ needs. Since 1998, specific 
legislation allowed the creation of municipal corporations (Empresas Municipais), 
responsible for the provision of local services. Municipal corporations are agencies with 
juridical personality and administrative, financial, and patrimonial autonomy. They are 
regulated by the law of Public Enterprises and by the commercial society’s code. 
Municipal corporations are created with a similar goal of those in the private sector, but 
with the mission of developing activities under the monitoring of each local 
government. Municipal corporations have a higher degree of autonomy than municipal 
and municipalized services. However, local government superintendence power allows 
them a control similar to the one obtained with hierarchical power. In inter-municipal 
corporations we have a similar scenario, except that this control is shared with other 
local governments.  
In commercial societies (enterprises) the level of control and competition 
depends very much on the shareholders. So, commercial societies with the majority of 
private capital have more competition and less direct control from local governments 
than the ones where municipalities hold the majority of shares.  
The relationships between local governments and private agents (contracting-out 
or franchising) are characterized by the absence of a hierarchical relation between the 
principal and the agent. The nature of the relationship is based upon the contract which 
relies on duties and obligations of the contracting parties. The typical power of direction 
(issue orders, revoke decisions, and punish) has limited effect in terms of the contract. 
Finally, in network partnerships there is a high coordination of interests and a 
high spirit of mutual help among local governments and third sector agents. In 
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metropolitan associations and municipal associations, municipal control is less 
significant. These configurations are characterized by high levels of cooperation, mostly 
due to the voluntary associative nature of the organizational agreement. 
	  
6. Data Analysis and Findings 
It is our goal to analyze the use of governance mechanisms by Portuguese 
municipalities and determine if they are chosen as a consequence of the nature of 
activities. During the period between April and October 2008, we sent a survey to all 
278 Portuguese municipalities and received 101 answers, corresponding to 37,4% of the 
total. 
For the three hypotheses presented, we compare the mean, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum values of the three groups of municipal activities, previously 
identified. In order to test our first hypothesis, we expect to observe that, in the group 
composed of local economic development, distribution, regulatory and supervisory 
activities, the use of hierarchical governance mechanisms should be much higher than 
the other mechanisms. In our second hypothesis, we expect that activities that meet the 
characteristics of the possibility of exclusion and rivalry in consumption, the average of 
the market governance mechanism is superior to the others. Finally, in our third 
hypothesis, we expect that activities with a redistributive or social nature or requiring a 
high initial investment display a higher presence of network mechanisms of governance. 
Table 5 presents the overall results of our survey for each local government activity. 
 
Table 5. Overall Survey Responses 
Governance Mechanism 
Activities 
Hierarchic  Market Network 
Audit and Licensing of Economic Activities; 96,55% 1,15% 2,30% 
Urban Management and Planning;  96,94% 2,04% 1,02% 
Management of Urban Mobility 97,56% 1,22% 1,22% 
Municipal Police 94,12% 0,00% 5,88% 
Veterinary Services 91,86 5,81% 2,33% 
Tourism Promotion 92,39% 1,09% 6,52% 
Urban Management and Rehabilitation 95,89% 0,00% 4,11% 
Foreign Cooperation 92,86% 0,00% 7,14% 
Aviation Infrastructure Maintenance and Administration; 75,00% 16,67% 8,33% 
Markets Suppliers Maintenance and Administration; 82,35% 2,94% 14,71% 
Industrial Park Maintenance and Management;  88,64% 9,09% 2,27% 
Building Safety; 65,67% 34,33% 0,00% 
Building Maintenance; 84,51% 15,49% 0,00% 
Distribution of Electric Power (Low-voltage); 6,52% 69,57% 23,19% 
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Road Conservation 65,88% 34,12% 0,00% 
Collective Service Transports; 40,43% 57,45% 2,13% 
Solid Waste Collection 48,91% 23,91% 27,17% 
Solid Waste Treatment 11,11% 21,11% 67,78% 
Water supply 71,58% 12.63% 15.79% 
Wastewater Treatment 49,11% 18,82% 31,76% 
Fire Department and Civil Protection; 53,57% 1,79% 44,64% 
Graveyard Maintenance and Administration; 97,75% 2,25% 0,00% 
Parking Facilities Maintenance and Administration 82,46% 17,45% 0,00% 
Maintenance and Parking Management  71,43% 28,57% 0,00% 
Maintenance and Administration Canteens 72,50% 20,00% 7,50% 
Kennel Maintenance and Administration; 71,19% 1,69% 27,12% 
Public Parks and Gardens Maintenance 84,78% 13,04% 2,17% 
Health Care and Medical Assistance 22,86% 37,14% 40,00% 
Elderly Services 55,88% 4,41% 39,71% 
Poverty and Social Exclusion Combat Program 72,15% 0,00% 27,85% 
Department of Urban Hygiene 87,34% 7,59% 5,06% 
Social Housing; 94,20% 0,00% 5,80% 
School Transport Services 65,17% 31,46% 3,37% 
Kindergarten Maintenance and Administration 93,24% 1,35% 5,41% 
School Maintenance 96,34% 2,44% 1,22% 
Youth Support Services 78,26% 6,52% 15,22% 
Swimming- Pool Maintenance and Management 93,26% 2,25% 4,49% 
Stadium Maintenance and Management 83,87% 6,45% 9,68% 
Maintenance and administration of sports halls 92,31% 1,28% 6,41% 
Museum Maintenance and Management  98,25% 0,00% 1,75% 
Library Maintenance and Management 100% 0,00% 0,00% 
Theater Maintenance and Management 96,36% 1,82% 1,82% 
  N = 101 Municipalities Surveyed	  
 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the use of hierarchical mechanisms 
across the three groups of municipal activities previously displayed in Table 3.  
 
Table 6. Hierarchical Mechanisms 
 
Despite the supremacy across the board of the hierarchical mechanisms, it is 
important to emphasize that, as it was expected, its dominance is greater in the first 
group. Indeed, if we compare the average, standard deviation, and minimum values 
found, hierarchical mechanisms are more prevalent in the activities of the first group, 
showing the lowest values in Group 2. The standard deviation also indicates a greater 
consistency in the use of hierarchy mechanisms in Group 1. Compared with Group 2, 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Mean 89,15% 63,35% 70,56% 
Standard Deviation 11,13% 22,29% 30,04% 
Minimum 53,57% 6,52% 11,11% 
Maximum 97,75% 84,78% 100% 
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the results in the third group seem to indicate a higher adoption of hierarchical 
mechanisms, but below those of the first group. Thus, these data appear to confirm our 
initial hypothesis that economic development, distribution, regulatory and supervisory 
activities clearly tend to be provided by hierarchical structures and in-house 
bureaucracies. Table 7 displays the results concerning the use of market mechanisms. 	  
Table 7. Market Mechanisms 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Mean 2,73% 29,84% 8,99% 
Standard Deviation 2,68% 17,71% 11,89% 
Minimum 0,00% 12,62% 0,00% 
Maximum 9,09% 69,57% 37,14% 	  
Analyzing the results for the market mechanisms, we verify that it is not the 
prevalent choice in any of the three groups. However, we notice that both the average 
(29.84%) and the maximum value (69.57%) are much higher for activities included in 
Group 2. The lower standard deviation also indicates that the choice of market 
mechanisms is more consistent in Group 2 when compared with the others. Thus, in this 
case, the results indicate that there is a stronger inclination to adopt market mechanisms 
for activities with characteristics of possibility of exclusion and rivalry in consumption. 
We should stress that, in the past, virtually all services were provided by hierarchical 
solutions, so that an average of 29.84% represents an important sign of change in the 
adoption of service delivery mechanisms. 
 
Table 8. Networks Mechanisms 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Mean 8,12% 6,70% 20,45% 
Standard Deviation 11,12% 9,89% 21,12% 
Minimum 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Maximum 44,64% 27,17% 67,78% 	  
Finally, Table 8 presents the results for the network type mechanisms. Regarding 
network mechanisms we again stress that this is not a mechanism adopted by the 
majority of any of the three groups. But again, if we analyze the average (20.45%) and 
maximum (67.78%), they seem to point to a greater willingness to choose this 
governance mechanism for the activities that compose Group 3. However, the standard 
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deviation shows a large variability in the use of networks in all three groups. This 
finding can be interpreted as an indicator of the lack of homogeneity of the activities 
included in the third group in relation to the governance mechanisms chosen. Again, 
although there is a greater preponderance of hierarchical solutions in Group 3, it is 
reasonable to argue a more discreet movement towards the adoption of network 
mechanisms.	  	  
Figure 1. Governance Mechanism by Group 
	  
 
Figure 1 graphically summarizes all the alternative governance mechanisms for 
the three groups of municipal activities. Thus, from the overall results presented above 
we conclude that the nature of municipal activities determines, to some extent, the 
mechanisms of governance chosen, thereby confirming the three hypotheses set out to 
test this relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the results, we are led to conclude that our first hypothesis is 
confirmed. As expected, hierarchical mechanisms are more dominant in Group 1, that 
is, activities of economic development, distribution, regulation, and supervision are 
overwhelmingly carried out by mechanisms of hierarchy.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The results show a progressive movement towards the adoption of market 
solutions. As we expected, Group 2 displays higher levels of use of market mechanisms 
in comparison to the remaining groups. Therefore, we conclude that activities involving 
the possibility of exclusion and rivalry in consumption are increasingly provided by 
market mechanisms.  
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63.35%	   70.56%	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Hypothesis 3: We can argue that activities included in Group 3 may be displaying 
gradual adoption of network solutions. However, it is important to express some 
reservations regarding this finding, since we detected some inconsistencies in the use of 
this mechanism of governance in the activities included in this particular group. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The first conclusion we can draw from our findings is that hierarchical 
mechanisms are the dominant form of governance in all three groups of municipal 
activities. A possible explanation lies in the history and political culture of local 
governments in Portugal. The long tradition of direct provision by local governments 
and a predominantly parochial political culture have combined to produce distinctive 
influences, which still condition present choices (Scott 1995). In addition, there is a 
strong mayoral tendency, traditionally seen as responsible for the production and 
delivery of public goods and services. For years, municipalities have assumed their 
responsibilities in an isolated form, without any type of contract or collaboration with 
other organizations or sectors.  
It is also important to underline that local governments were, during the 
dictatorship period (1926-1974), mere extensions of the national government. This is a 
relevant fact to explain an almost innate tendency to adopt hierarchical solutions as a 
default. Pressed by the collective needs and the political agenda, the political decision-
maker is mostly inclined to adopt in-house solutions. Moreover, as already mentioned, 
only in the mid-1980s, the option of using the market became a viable alternative. Inter-
organizational partnerships as governance forms are even more recent. 
In spite of these historical conditions, the role and structure of municipal 
governments changed substantially after the democratic revolution, assuming a growing 
importance in the provision of public goods and services to citizens. Over the years, a 
wider range of solutions has been adopted by municipalities in order to accommodate 
new functional responsibilities and meet a larger scope of citizen needs and preferences. 
New organizational forms such as contracting with private agents, building complex 
networks with other local governments, and partnerships with nonprofits, are nowadays 
widespread forms of service delivery adopted by local governments in Portugal. 
The main goal of the paper was to analyze whether the nature of services 
determines the choice of governance mechanisms in Portuguese local governments. We 
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notice that there is a great penchant for solutions of hierarchy. One explanation is the 
legacy of the “Estado Novo” and the cultural tradition of centralized local governments. 
This conclusion is in line with prior studies pointing out the persistence of institutional 
characteristics as a ‘genetic code’ (Araújo, 1999, 2001, 2002; Rocha, 2001). However, 
we note that a progressive trend is developing in the adoption of alternative governance 
mechanisms that, to a certain extent, are replacing traditional local bureaucracies in 
service delivery.  
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